The minute
- Global Witness recorded 26 environmental activists killed in Brazil in 2025, up from 12 in 2024, a 116% increase.
- Among the victims were 11 small farmers and 7 indigenous people, with half of the deaths concentrated in the Amazon states of Rondônia and Pará.
- Globally, 124 defenders were killed in 2025; Latin America accounted for 105 (roughly 85%), with Colombia (39) and Brazil (26) together representing 52% of all cases.
Why it matters: The spike in lethal violence against environmental defenders in Brazil does not exist in a vacuum. Rondônia and Pará are also the states at the center of cattle ranching expansion, illegal logging, and gold mining, activities directly tied to commodity supply chains that reach European, North American, and Asian markets. For companies sourcing beef, soy, timber, or minerals from the Brazilian Amazon, rising violence against local communities is an operational and regulatory risk that can no longer be treated as background noise.
What changes for companies with Brazilian supply chains
The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which entered its enforcement phase in late 2025, requires importers to demonstrate that commodities were produced without contributing to deforestation or forest degradation. While the regulation’s text focuses on land-use change, the due diligence framework it demands, including geolocation data and supplier traceability, exposes companies to scrutiny over the social conditions surrounding production. A supplier operating in a municipality where environmental defenders are being murdered raises a due diligence red flag that auditors, investors, and regulators can trace. Companies that cannot demonstrate awareness of, and response to, these risks face exclusion from EU markets or reputational damage in ESG ratings.
Beyond the EUDR, voluntary frameworks such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights already establish that companies should identify and mitigate adverse human rights impacts linked to their operations and supply chains. The concentration of violence in cattle and timber frontiers means that agribusiness firms, meatpackers, and traders with procurement in Pará and Rondônia face the most direct exposure. Institutional investors applying human rights screens to portfolios may reprice that risk.
Brazil’s defender protection program and its gaps
Brazil operates the Programa de Proteção aos Defensores de Direitos Humanos (PPDDH), a federal initiative created in 2004 and regulated by Decree 9.937/2019, which is supposed to offer protective measures to threatened activists, including relocation, police escorts, and psychosocial support. The program is managed by the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship and operates through agreements with state governments. In practice, coverage is uneven. Not all states have signed cooperation agreements, and the program has historically suffered from budget constraints and slow response times. The fact that violence surged in Rondônia and Pará, states with active deforestation frontiers, suggests that the existing protection architecture is failing precisely where it is most needed.
The Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT), cited in the source, maintains its own annual conflict registry that often records higher figures than international organizations because it includes threats, attempted murders, and other forms of violence beyond confirmed killings. Whether the federal government will expand the PPDDH’s budget or operational reach in response to the Global Witness data remains undecided, especially in the current electoral context. Any meaningful reform would require not only more funding but also coordination with state-level security forces, which in frontier regions often have ties to the very economic actors driving the violence.
Who gains and who loses
The immediate losers are indigenous communities and small farmers in the Amazon, who face lethal risk for defending their land. But the damage extends further. Brazilian agribusiness as a whole loses credibility in international markets when violence statistics climb, even among producers operating legally and sustainably. The country’s post-COP30 diplomatic positioning, built on a narrative of indigenous inclusion and environmental commitment, is weakened by data showing that defenders are being killed at accelerating rates.
On the other side, illegal loggers, wildcat miners, and land grabbers benefit from a protection vacuum. Each unpunished killing sends a signal that resistance carries a fatal cost, which consolidates informal territorial control. International competitors of Brazilian commodity exporters, particularly in the beef and soy sectors, may also benefit indirectly as buyers seek lower-risk sourcing alternatives in response to tightening due diligence requirements.
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